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One has to be impressed by the volume of research produced in
the last fifteen years that has applied economics to analyze legal is-
sues-in particular, the subjects of torts and crimes. The nature of the
inquiry has been diverse. It has included normative analysis of the im-
plications that economics has for the design of a particular rule of law'
as well as positive analysis, using economic arguments, of why the com-
mon law has taken the form it has.2 The economic approach has fea-
tured both theoretical analysis 3 and empirical work4 on legal issues.
The literature has developed not only in publications explicitly devoted
to law and economics5 but in law reviews and leading economics jour-
nals as well. Volumes have been produced that provide comprehensive
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Bruce Ackerman, Ian Ayres, Jules Coleman, Robert Ellickson, Owen Fiss, Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Steven Shavell, and Judith Thomson for helpful discussions and for
their comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I am also very grateful to Gene
Schaerr for his helpful research assistance. These people, of course, bear no responsi-
bility for any faults that remain.
1. See, e.g., G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970); R. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law (2d ed. 1977).
2. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 1, at 179-91; Priest, The Common Law Process
and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6J. Legal Stud. 65 (1977); Priest, Selective Charac-
teristics of Litigation, 9 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1980); Rubin, Why is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6J. Legal Stud. 51 (1977).
3. See, e.g., Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Analysis, 76 J. Pol.
Econ. 169 (1968); Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2J. Legal Stud. 323
(1973); Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3J. Legal Stud. 107 (1974); Polinsky, Strict
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tivities: An Economic Analysis, in Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment 68
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treatment of recent work on economic analysis of law in general6 or
give detailed attention to particular areas.7
In addressing this symposium's subject of new directions in law
and economics, I shall assume that at least the broad characteristics of
this literature are known and confine my discussion to some observa-
tions about an aspect of our enterprise that needs more attention.
Stated most generally, the point I want to emphasize is that eco-
nomic analysis of any issue does not take place in a vacuum. In particu-
lar, law-and-economics analyses are confined by political institutions,
moral norms, social conventions, and widely shared beliefs about the
rights and obligations of members of a society and of the society itself.
The problems addressed in law and economics are themselves struc-
tured by those institutions, principles, and convictions. This
noneconomic foundation has implications for the way we who work in
law and economics do our research and for the way we ought to under-
stand the results of that research.
Section I begins with an argument that I have made elsewhere
about the central role of political, legal, and moral presuppositions in
any theory of the criminal category, even an economic one, and then
explains how the same point applies more broadly to all economic anal-
ysis of law. In Section II, I illustrate this point in the context of a soci-
ety's choice of legal rules to control some set of harms that its members
may visit upon one another. Finally, Section III indicates how a partic-
ular noneconomic basis for society's distinguishing among harms and
harm-generating activities, namely the moral culpability of the injurer's
behavior, introduces new elements into the previous section's analysis.
I. NONECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIc ANALYSIS
OF LAW
In a previous paper, I argued that the economists' literature on
crime is inherently incomplete.8 The problem arises in the efforts of
law-and-economics scholars to explain the existence of the criminal cat-
6. See, e.g., W. Hirsch, Law and Economics: An Introductory Analysis (1979); J.
Oliver, Law and Economics: An Introduction (1979); A. Polinsky, An Introduction to
Law and Economics (1983); R. Posner, supra note 1; G. Tullock, The Logic of the Law
(1971). For a valuable introduction to some of these works, see Cooter, Law and the
Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Law and a
Review of the Major Books, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 1260 (1982).
7. See, e.g., R. Anderson, The Economics of Crime (1976); Economic Foundations
of Property Law (B. Ackerman ed. 1975); The Economics of Contract Law (A. Kronman
& R. Posner eds. 1979); Economics of Corporation Law and Securities Regulation (R.
Posner & K. Scott eds. 1980); The Economics of Medical Malpractice (S. Rottenberg ed.
1978); K. Elzinga & W. Breit, The Antitrust Penalties: A Study in Law and Economics
(1976); W. Luksetich & M. White, Crime and Public Policy: An Economic Approach
(1982); L. Phillips & H. Votey, The Economics of Crime Control (1981).
8. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in Nomos XXVII: Criminal Jus-
tice 289 U. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1985).
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egory-to explain why we distinguish a set of acts that we call crimes.
The incompleteness exists, I argued, because any economic theory of
crime depends on and is confined by a set of legal and political
presuppositions. 9
Essentially, the economic explanations of the criminal category say
that acts are characterized as crimes if the actor tries to set conditions
under which a transfer of entitlements will occur and those conditions
do not conform to the ones society has stipulated. Society refuses to
accept the actor's efforts to redefine the terms of transfer. The two
principal contributions that draw upon economic analysis to explain
why a society distinguishes a set of acts as crimes provide narrower rea-
sons for the distinction. Richard Posner argues that the criminal sanc-
tion is used to induce individuals to engage in voluntary rather than
coercive transactions with one another when voluntary ones are feasi-
ble at low enough cost. For Posner, acts are categorized as crimes and
treated accordingly because society wishes to direct transactions into
market settings whenever that is economically feasible.10 Guido Cala-
bresi and Douglas Melamed suggest that particular acts are distin-
guished as crimes, for which special sanctions are imposed, because
society needs to prevent individual members of society from changing
property rules and inalienability rules into liability rules at their individ-
ual discretion."'
Both Posner's and Calabresi and Melamed's explanations are, as I
have argued elsewhere, too restrictive. 12 For example, a society that
makes the buying and selling of votes a crime imposes the criminal
sanction on someone who, in Posner's terms, substitutes a market
transaction for a nonmarket transaction, and in Calabresi and Me-
lamed's terms, converts an inalienability rule into a property rule. This
is the reverse of what both Posner's and Calabresi and Melamed's mod-
els of the criminal category suggest. A society might also bring the
criminal sanction to bear on someone who, in Calabresi and Melamed's
terminology, converts a liability rule into a property rule, instead of the
other way around, as their model suggests. This would be the case, for
example, if the society decides that all pollution control requirements
should be imposed in a collective manner, so that entitlements to be
free from pollution are protected by a liability rule, and makes it a
crime for a polluter to "bribe" individual pollutees to tolerate higher
emission levels.
Because of these possibilities, which are excluded from the Posner
and the Calabresi-Melamed analyses, it is desirable to reformulate the
economic explanation in more general terms. An act is a crime because
9. Id. at 290, 301-04.
10. See R. Posner, supra note 1, at 163-72.
11. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1124-27 (1972).
12. Klevorick, supra note 8, at 301-03.
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the actor behaves in a way that is contrary to what I call the transaction
structure that society has established. This structure sets out the terms
or conditions under which particular transactions or exchanges are to
take place under different circumstances. Under this economic expla-
nation, the criminal sanction is employed to enforce the transaction
structure that society has chosen as well as to charge the offending ac-
tor for the harms that his action imposes on individuals within the soci-
ety. This charge includes whatever monetary and nonmonetary
penalties are imposed on the criminal; there is no assumption that the
fine, if there is one, will be used to compensate the victims for the
harms they have suffered. The sanction imposes a penalty on the crimi-
nal for his effort to secure an unfair advantage by seeking to avoid com-
plying with the transaction structure-including the laws of property,
contract, and tort-to which the other members of society conform
their conduct.
An explanation of why some acts are crimes while others are not
therefore requires an inquiry into how the society legitimates its trans-
action structure. What is the source of the political power that gives the
collectivity the right to decide the terms on which particular transac-
tions will take place? Why does the right to structure some transactions
rest with the individual while the form of others is determined by the
collectivity? What moral judgments of the society make some acts crim-
inal? These are questions that neither economists nor economic analy-
sis has a comparative advantage in answering.
This type of inquiry is from the analyst's point of view positive, not
normative, in nature. That is, how a society legitimates its transaction
structure forms part of a theory that explains the existence of the crimi-
nal categoryfor that society. To be sure, the analyst could raise these
same questions on a wholly normative, not descriptive, level. An
outside observer with an independent set of values could assess the jus-
tifications offered by a society for classifying certain acts as criminal.
The analyst might decide that the rules society established to govern
transactions were indefensible in light of his set of exogenous values.
The evaluative enterprise of this outside observer is very different from
the explanatory inquiry that is needed to derive a theory of crime for a
specific society, taking that society's normative judgments as given.
The law-and-economics explanation of the criminal sanction pre-
supposes the existence of a transaction structure. For any particular
society, one will observe a set of acts being considered crimes; from this
one can infer that these acts are contrary to the society's transaction
structure. But explaining a particular society's transaction structure re-
quires an understanding of societal values-a conception of how a soci-
ety legitimates its transaction structure. This, too, is a descriptive
inquiry concerned with the actual moral, political, and legal commit-
ments of the particular society rather than with norms derived by ap-
peal to abstract moral argument.
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The need to answer questions about legitimation of the transaction
structure to explain the existence of the criminal category implies that
although an explanation of why society invokes the criminal sanction
can be stated in economic terms, that vocabulary and mode of analysis
do not provide a complete substantive understanding. To the contrary,
a coherent explanation of the criminal category necessitates answers to
noneconomic questions about political legitimacy and authority, about
the rights of individuals and the power of the state, about the political,
moral, and legal constraints on the exercise of rights and powers. A
prerequisite to undertaking a full microeconomic analysis of crime is a
certain minimum of information about political and legal foundations.
In commenting on this argument, Judge Posner has observed that
a theory of rights underlies the economic analysis of torts as much as it
provides the infrastructure for the economic theory of crime.1 3 He ar-
gues that we should not wait for the development of consensus on a
political theory of rights in our society before undertaking economic
analysis of crime. Judge Posner seems to have focused on the prescrip-
tive role of a theory of rights in an economic theory of crime whereas I
am emphasizing the analytic or descriptive role of such a theory-the
way in which an understanding of legal and political norms in a society
provides the foundation for an economic theory of crime applicable to
that society. But his argument does point up a way in which I overdrew
the distinction between the economic theory of crime and the economic
theory of other branches of law, particularly torts.
What I have argued about the economic theory of crime applies to
other areas of law as well: a minimal legal and political foundation
must be posited before one can pursue any law-and-economics analysis
as that analysis is currently undertaken. This observation emerges
most saliently in considering the economists' or the lawyer-economists'
literature on crime precisely because the law in that area is, from an
economic perspective, addressed to acts contrary to, or assaults upon,
the transaction structure. It applies with equal force in other areas as
well, but is less apparent in relation to them because in areas like torts,
contracts, and property the transaction is more easily identified, and the
economic analysis concerns actions taken in conformity with the trans-
action structure. Hence, in those areas, questions of the legitimacy of
that transaction structure and the political, moral, and legal constraints
upon it do not come so strongly to the fore.
Because any microeconomic analysis of law presupposes answers
to noneconomic questions and presumes features of the political,
moral, and legal landscape, we must recognize the conditional nature
of the results of such analysis. A change in the underlying legal and
political presuppositions may lead to a different conclusion concerning
13. Posner, Comment on "On the Economic Theory of Crime," in Nomos XXVII:
CriminalJustice 310, 310 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1985).
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the effects or the desirability of the particular rule of law that economic
analysis is being used to illuminate. Hence, our analyses should ex-
amine how our results change when plausible alterations are made in
the (sometimes implicit) assumptions about the legal and political set-
ting. Moreover, in formulating models of particular legal problems-
for example, the optimality of different liability rules or the optimal
combination of probability and severity of punishment-we should be
attentive to and should incorporate prevailing conceptions of the basic
moral, political, and legal structure.
Perhaps an analogy will help here. When John Rawls' A Theory of
Justice14 appeared, it gave rise to a flurry of articles that reconsidered
economists' policy recommendations when a "maximin" welfare func-
tion, derived from a narrow reading of Rawls, replaced the more con-
ventionally used utilitarian objective function. Such analyses were
undertaken in areas like taxation 15 and consumption of exhaustible re-
sources.16 The enterprise has abated, and my point is not that it should
have expanded to cover every problem that economists ever consid-
ered. Quite to the contrary, the enterprise was on the right track be-
cause it inquired about the possible economic effects of an alternative
political theory in precisely those areas where differences about the
fundamental structure of society were most likely to be regarded as
important.
I do not mean to reopen the debate about the appropriate defini-
tion of efficiency or the coherence of particular objective functions-for
example, wealth maximization' 7-that have been frequently used in the
law-and-economics literature. What I do want to argue is that there are
alternative plausible social objective functions and social constraints
that should be recognized, and that our policy recommendations may
well depend on which of these we employ. Consequently, in placing
one or another objective function at the center of our analysis our
choice should be informed by what we know about the relevant under-
lying societal structure, and we should engage in comparative-statics
analysis at the basic institutional level, always making clear the assump-
tions that underlie the analysis. The sensitivity of our results to differ-
ent conceptions of the basic legal -and political structure should be
examined. This is especially important because in many of the situa-
tions to which law-and-economics analysis is directed, the separation of
14. J. Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (1971).
15. See Atkinson, How progressive should income tax be?, in Essays in Modern
Economics 90 (1973); Phelps, Taxation of Wage Income For Economic Justice, 87 QJ.
Econ. 331 (1973); Sah, How Much Redistribution is Possible Through Commodity
Taxes?, 20J. Pub. Econ. 89 (1983).
16. See Solow, Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources, 41 Rev. Econ.
Stud.: Symposium 29 (1974).
17. For a good introduction to the debate, see Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal
Concern, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 485 (1980); A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8
Hofstra L. Rev. 811 (1980).
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efficiency considerations and distributional considerations, broadly
construed, is not well grounded in economic theory. That is, problems
in law and economics often arise precisely when the conditions under
which the basic theorems of welfare economics, which allow the separa-
tion of issues about the "size of the pie" from issues about how it is
divided, do not obtain.18
The features of the essential legal and political structure most
often taken for granted in a law-and-economics analysis cover a wide
range. Some examples are: Whose utility should count in the analy-
sis-should a tortfeasor be accorded treatment different from that
given to a criminal? How many distinctions is society willing to make
among people, among activities, among acts; and how does the fineness
of the distinction drawn differ with the purpose to which it is put?
When does the society recognize differences in types of harm-causing
behavior?
II. NEGLIGENCE VERSUS STRICT LIABILrrY: AN EXAMPLE
Let me use a familiar setting to illustrate the ways in which assump-
tions about the legal and political structure of a society condition the
results of law-and-economics analysis. Specifically, how will a society's
willingness or unwillingness to draw distinctions among people based
on particular characteristics affect the choice of a liability rule for that
society?
Suppose that individuals who engage in some activity suffer no
harms themselves but may harm those who do not participate in the
activity. Call the former "injurers" and those who suffer harms "vic-
tims." Note that we have said nothing about the nature of the activity-
for example, whether in our legal system the activity would give rise to
an action in tort, a criminal prosecution, or both. To keep matters sim-
ple, assume that both sets of individuals are risk neutral.
We will assume that victims can take no steps to prevent or to miti-
gate the harms they may suffer. Injurers, on the other hand, can affect
the probability and severity of the losses that victims suffer. 19 Injurers
derive benefits from engaging in the activity, which we furthermore as-
sume they undertake at exogenously given and fixed levels. Taking
care to reduce the likelihood or intensity of the harms injurers may cre-
ate reduces the benefits they derive from the activity, and the decrease
in benefits is directly related to how much care is taken.
Finally, while I will assume that victims are identical, I will suppose
that injurers differ in a crucial characteristic that manifests itself in im-
18. For a cogent development of this theme, see Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a
Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 1655 (1974).
19. These are what Shavell has termed unilateral harms. Shavell, Strict Liability
Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980).
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portant ways in our setting. First, injurers who differ in this characteris-
tic have different abilities to take care. If each of them expends the
same effort to reduce the probability or severity of harm, both the re-
sulting reductions in expected losses to victims and the marginal re-
turns to additional effort will differ. Second, when they take the same
loss-prevention and loss-reduction measures, injurers who differ in this
characteristic derive different levels of benefits from engaging in the
activity and incur different decreases in benefits from small increases in
their care-taking efforts. Because of these differences among injurers,
the society's attitude toward drawing distinctions based upon the cru-
cial characteristic will affect its selection of an approach to controlling
the harms being considered here. Moreover, let us assume that it is very
easy to observe variations in this crucial characteristic among injurers
and that the relationship between this characteristic and its effect on the
benefits and costs of injurer care-taking is deterministic. In other
words, there is no random variation in the effects of a given care level
being exercised by injurers with a particular level of this characteristic.
A standard law-and-economics approach to analyzing the optimal
way to control harm-causing activity in the setting just described would
posit as the welfare criterion the benefits injurers derive from engaging
in the activity minus both the expected losses victims suffer and the
costs of taking care. Expressed differently, the goal would be the mini-
mization of the expected costs of harms and the costs of avoiding harms
where the avoidance cost is measured by the decrease in injurers' bene-
fits caused by their taking care. This formulation abstracts from issues
of distributional equity as it assumes that equal weight is given to the
benefit or cost experienced by each actor, whether he is an injurer or a
victim. Consequently, this analytical structure does not encompass any
distributive grounds for choosing one harm control system rather than
another, although distributive reasons are undoubtedly important in
the choices societies actually make.
Let x denote the expenditure of effort on care, and let k be an in-
dex, running from 0 to 1, that measures what I have referred to as the
crucial characteristic that differs among injurers. The ability to take
care is related to k. Denote by u(x,k) the income equivalent of the bene-
fits that an injurer with characteristic level k derives from engaging in
the activity when he expends effort x on taking care. Finally, let p (x,k)
be the probability that an injurer of characteristic level k who takes care
at level x injures a victim; and let h(x,k) be the income equivalent of the
harm that a victim suffers if he is injured by a k-type injurer exercising
care level x. Since all agents are assumed to be risk neutral, however,
we can combine the probability of harm and severity of harm and speak
only of the expected losses, denoted c (x,k), of a victim in an interaction
with an injurer of characteristic k and care level x.
I assume, as stated earlier, that both u(x,k) and c(x,k) are strictly
decreasing in x; and I assume, as a matter of convention, that u(x,k) is
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strictly increasing in k. The only assumption about how c(x,k) varies
with k is that the partial derivative ck(x,k) is nonzero almost everywhere:
that is, for almost any (x,k) pair, a small change in k will change the
expected losses. Next, as indicated earlier, assume that changes in
characteristic level k affect both the marginal social benefit of taking
care (the marginal reduction in expected losses to victims, c,(x,k)) and
the marginal social cost of taking care (the marginal reduction in injur-
ers' benefits, u,(x,k)). Finally, for technical simplicity, suppose that both
u(x,k) and c (x,k) are smooth functions (at least twice continuously differ-
entiable) and that u(x,k) is strictly concave while c (x,k) is strictly convex.
Since the purpose of this model 20 is illustrative, make one more
simplifying assumption: all interactions between injurers and victims
occur in unique pairs-one injurer interacts with only one victim and
vice versa. Hence, iff(k) denotes the frequency with which characteris-
tic k occurs in the population of injurers-that is,f(k) is the probability
density function of the characteristic-the social welfare function in our
example is:
(1) Maximize 1 fufx(k), k]-c[x(k),k]jf(k)dk,
0
where x(k) denotes the level of care taken by an injurer of characteristic
k.
It is apparent that the social welfare function in (1) can be maxi-
mized term by term so that in the socially optimal solution we would
have an injurer with characteristic k exercising the care level that solves
the problem
(2) Maximize u(x,k) - c(x,k).
x_-0
Assuming that it is socially optimal for each injurer to exercise some
care, the social optimum or first-best arrangement is for an injurer of
characteristic k to choose the care level that satisfies
(3) ux(x,k) - c(x,k) = 0.
That is, each type of injurer should simply be operating at that care
level at which the marginal social cost of his caretaking is equal to the
marginal social benefit of his efforts. 21 Denote by x*(k) the solution to
equation (3)-the socially optimal level of care for an injurer whose
index of the crucial characteristic is k.
It will not be socially optimal to have injurers with different meas-
20. The model combines features contained in a number of earlier contributions to
the literature on liability rules, especially those of Steven Shavell. See id.; Shavell, A
Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 Rand J. Econ. 271
(1984).
21. Relaxing the assumption that it is socially optimal for every type of injurer to
take care requires consideration of corner solutions but does not affect the basic point of
the argument that follows.
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ures of the crucial characteristic take the same degree of care; in general
x*(k) will vary with k. 22 The notation and machinery may seem exces-
sive for making this point about x*(k), but they do help to bring it out
with clarity.
Since, by assumption, it is very easy to determine the level of the
crucial characteristic associated with any individual injurer, the social
optimum can be achieved under either a strict injurer liability system or
a negligence system, as these are usually modelled. If a strict liability
rule is in effect, an injurer must pay for all harms suffered by the victim
with whom he interacts. Under strict liability an injurer with character-
istic level k faces precisely the problem in (2) and chooses x*(k) as his
care level. With the negligence rule, an injurer must pay for harms if
and only if his expenditure of effort falls short of the due care level-
denote it :-specified by a social institution, such as a judge/jury com-
bination. If that institution were to set the due care level for an injurer
of type k at x*(k)-that is, :F(k) = x*(k)-a k-type injurer would choose
the care level x*(k), and once again the social optimum would be
achieved.
In the setting as specified so far, assuming away all administrative
costs, the society would be indifferent between the negligence rule and
the strict liability rule insofar as both lead to the maximum of the func-
tion in (1). Recall that the posited social welfare function abstracts
from distributional concerns. Hence, the fact that an injurer with char-
acteristic k pays c(x*(k),k) under the strict liability system and nothing
under the negligence rule does not tip the scale between the two rules
in either direction. Since the injurers' activity levels are exogenously
given and fixed, there is in this model no reason to choose between
negligence and strict liability on the ground of how much of the harm-
causing activity there is or who participates in it.
Suppose now that the crucial characteristic that differs among in-
jurers is, in fact, a characteristic that members of the society believe it is
illegitimate to use as a basis for distinguishing among individuals. As
part of the basic political structure, distinctions among members of the
society based on their level of the k index are viewed as classifications
that ought not be drawn.
If the society in our example were to regard the crucial characteris-
tic measured by the level of k as an improper ground for drawing legal
distinctions among people, the negligence and strict liability systems
would no longer be equivalent. It would no longer be possible to tailor
due care standards to levels of the crucial characteristic; instead, there
would have to be one due care standard specified for everyone. 23 Since
22. Had we imposed additional restrictions on the shapes of u(x,k) and c(x,k), we
would conclude, more strongly, that x*(k) is a distinct value for each distinct value of A.
23. Taken literally, our present system of tort law appears to impose a single stan-
dard of care-the "reasonably prudent person" standard-on everyone. In fact, how-
ever, since that rule requires that the trier of fact consider what the reasonably prudent
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the optimal solution to (1), x*(k), varies with k, the negligence system
constrained to satisfy iF(k) = :F for all k must yield a lower value of the
social welfare function in (1). A negligence system with the same due
care standard for everyone cannot do as well in terms of the goal speci-
fied in (1) as one in which the due care standard is tailored to the indi-
vidual injurer's ability to take care, no matter what the level of the
unitary standard. The strict liability rule, on the other hand, will still be
able to yield the maximum value of that function as long as the
legal/political prohibition in the hypothesized society is only on distinc-
tions that are explicitly drawn among people with different values of the
characteristic, and not on differences in the actual efforts they are ob-
served to expend. If, however, the society were concerned about the
actual care-taking efforts that individuals had to make because of the
legal rule's operation, then the strict liability rule would be as imper-
missible as the negligence rule with tailored due care standards. Only
legal rules that induced all injurers, regardless of their k value, to take
exactly the same level of care would then meet the society's constraints.
The advantage of the strict liability rule over the negligence rule in
the model we have been discussing is analogous to a well known result
in Shavell's work.2 4 He considers a model of unilateral accidents be-
tween strangers in which injurers, who are identical, can vary both their
activity levels and the care they exercise. Expected accident costs de-
pend on each injurer's chosen levels of care and activity. But the activ-
ity level is not considered by the legal system in the formulation of the
due care standard. Shavell demonstrates that in this situation, strict
liability is efficient and superior to the negligence rule.
In Shavell's model, as in the one presented here, an important fac-
tor is omitted from the specification of the due care threshold, and this
threshold is central to the negligence rule's operation. In Shavell's case
this exclusion results from limitations on the competence of courts to
gather and process data upon which to decide the appropriate activity
level for injurers. In the current context it derives from a political or
moral constraint on courts. In reality, classifications based upon sus-
pect crucial characteristics would be not only impermissible but also
functionally unreliable as a way of distinguishing among actors because
of intragroup variation in care-taking ability among individuals who
would be similarly classified. But this element of statistical variation
has been excluded from the simplified model we have been discussing.
Any prescriptive law-and-economics analysis of a negligence sys-
person would have done under all the circumstances, the apparent unitary standard ac-
tually allows for consideration of individual circumstances and characteristics in a variety
of contexts. For example, children are sometimes held to a lower standard of care than
adults, and professionals are sometimes held to a higher standard than nonprofession-
als. See, e.g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts 173-93 (5th ed. 1984).
24. See Shavell, supra note 19, at 10-14.
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tem for the hypothetical society we have constructed must take account
of the kinds of legal distinctions that are and are not permitted in that
society. Determining the negligence rule that solves (1) without taking
into account the relevant constraints will yield a nonoptimal-indeed,
an infeasible-solution for the society. The unconstrained cost-mini-
mizing solution is not the social optimum for a society that will not
draw the kinds of distinctions required by that solution.
One could argue that this inability to use the social welfare func-
tion in (1) to determine the social optimum here arises simply because
we have omitted from our objective function the costs of relying on
these suspect classifications. One could make this precise by noting
that if we solved (1) with the appended constraints x (k') = x (k") for all
k" and k". we could determine the shadow prices25 on the constraints-
the social cost of not invoking the suspect classification. By attaching
prices of these magnitudes to divergences among different groups'
standards of care and incorporating the resulting costs into the objec-
tive function, the new optimal solution would emerge with x(k) = :F for
all k.
There are, however, two problems with this way of rehabilitating
the pure cost minimization approach. First, it is somewhat circular to
impute costs of violating constraints when those costs are only com-
puted ex post-that is, after the constrained optimum is determined.
Second, and more basically, there is a categorical distinction between a
society's imposing a constraint on itself because it has a principled posi-
tion that it does not want to do something and a society's simply imput-
ing a finite price or cost to its doing that same thing.26
III. TORTS VERSUS CRIMES: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF
THE MORAL DIMENSION
Legal and political presuppositions can have an even more funda-
mental effect on a law-and-economics analysis of the type illustrated in
Section II. Economic analysis of the optimal way to control harm-caus-
ing activity may be profoundly affected by the legal category in which
the action engendering harm is placed. To the extent that
noneconomic considerations are, as I have argued, central to that cate-
gorization, they may have a major impact on the law-and-economics
analysis that is undertaken. Hence, we have to ask exactly what kind of
activity gives rise to the "harms" that injurers inflict and victims suffer
in our example. In particular, are we analyzing a problem in tort or in
crime-and does it make any difference? I would argue that whether or
25. The shadow price indicates how the optimal value of the objective function
would change if the constraint were relaxed by a small amount.
26. This is, of course, a controversial proposition. For an illuminating discussion,
see Coleman, Foundations of Constitutional Economics, in Containing the Economic
Powers of Government (1983).
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not it makes a difference depends on the society's reasons for distin-
guishing among harmful actions. This section considers the possible
effects that one leading noneconomic explanation of the difference be-
tween tort and crime may have on the type of law-and-economics analy-
sis illustrated in Section II.
A large number of torts and criminal law scholars have emphasized
the crucial role that moral notions play in providing an account of the
criminal category. In his influential pair of articles on "Interrelations of
Criminal Law and Torts," 27 Jerome Hall argued that "the most defensi-
ble position, stated broadly, is that the more general doctrines of the
criminal law are founded on principles of moral culpability," 28 that the
value judgments underlying torts and criminal law differ,29 and that at
the heart of the criminal law is the belief "that it is just to punish those
who have knowingly committed moral wrongs, proscribed by law."30
For Hall, "moral culpability is of secondary importance in tort law-
immoral conduct is simply one of various ways by which individuals suf-
fer damage. But in penal law. . . the immorality of the actor's conduct
is essential-whereas pecuniary damage is irrelevant." 3' He crisply
stated his general thesis "that moral culpability should remain the es-
sence of criminal liability, and that existing legal classifications should
be reorganized on that basis."
32
More recently, in distinguishing between tort and crime as two sys-
tems of individual responsibility, Richard Epstein has emphasized the
need to distinguish between accidental and deliberate harms. 33 He de-
fends the position, which he attributes to Hall and Hart, "that the crim-
inal law works best when it deals with conduct of the defendant that the
law thinks worthy of moral condemnation, and that it works worst when
in the name of effective social control it modifies its standards byjudg-
ing actors at their peril."'34 Epstein sees as the basic point that "enor-
mous caution is needed before criminal liability is imposed and that the
individual subjected to punishment should by virtue of what he has
done be deserving of that punishment." 35 Other authors have also
stressed the central role of moral fault in the criminal law.
36
27. Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts (pts. 1 & 2), 43 Colum. L. Rev.
753, 967 (1943).
28. Id. pt. 1, at 771.
29. Id. at 775.
30. Id. at 776.
31. Id. pt. 2, at 971.
32. Id. at 996.
33. Epstein, Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles, in Assessing the Criminal:
Restitution, Retribution, and the Legal Process 231, 247-48 (1977).
34. Id. at 248.
35. Id. (emphasis in original).
36. Jules Coleman similarly focuses on "the key moral notions of criminal responsi-
bility-of guilt and fault." Coleman, Crime, Kickers, and Transaction Structures, in No-
mos XXVII: Criminal Justice 313, 323 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1985). He
contrasts "the essentially non-moral character of negligence in torts" with "the essen-
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Suppose that the hypothetical society that we have been discussing
subscribes to the view of these and other scholars that moral culpability
is the essence of criminal liability. Then, although the formulation of
the problem in Section II can be used to analyze society's choice of a
liability rule in tort law, it may have to be modified if the harm is one for
which there is criminal liability.
If the moral condemnation that the society attaches to acts that re-
sult in the harms being analyzed is severe enough, it may induce a dra-
matic and basic change in the analysis-a modification of the
specification of the social welfare function in (1). The behavior of an
actor who generates a harm that is sufficiently morally reprehensible
may be regarded as so deserving of condemnation that he is viewed as
an "outlaw," a pariah, perhaps even a nonmember of society. As a re-
sult, the injurer's benefits may be given less weight-perhaps even no
weight at all-in the social welfare function. This is precisely the kind
of change that people generally associate with a move from discussions
of torts to discussions of crimes. But such a distinction cannot be de-
rived from the standard law-and-economics approach to explaining the
criminal sanction, which views criminal law as an extension of tort law.
This remains true even after that approach makes all sorts of adjust-
ments in the tort damages remedy such as incorporating detection costs
into fines and replacing fines with nonmonetary penalties forjudgment-
proof injurers. This discounting of the injurer's benefits in the social
welfare function must be rooted in noneconomic considerations. In the
example in Section II, if the injurer's utility were not to count at all, this
would lead to more stringent due care levels at the optimum, levels
sufficiently stringent to eliminate the harm entirely. Or, if we were
working with a model, like Gary Becker's, 37 of optimal policy toward
crime, we know from Becker's results that reducing the marginal social
value of the offender's gain would lead to higher levels of both the
probability of punishment and the severity of punishment.
The moral condemnation that the society attaches to the harmful
acts may not be strong enough to warrant discounting the injurer's
gains, but it may be enough to overcome the society's unwillingness to
draw distinctions on the basis of the crucial characteristic k. The soci-
ety's interest in assessing responsibility for acts that are sufficiently
morally reprehensible may induce it to trade off its strong aversion to
classifications based on the index k. In the context of our example, this
tially moral aspects of the conditions of responsibility in the criminal law." Id. at 326.
He, too, emphasizes the critical role in criminal law of the inquiry into whether the ac-
cused individual deserves to be punished. Id. Finally, Stephen Schulhofer has also
stressed the central role that the concept of fault plays in "making decisions about
criminalization, excuses, and the grading of offenses" and about the sanctioning struc-
ture as well. Schulhofer, Is There an Economic Theory of Crime?, in Nomos XXVII:
Criminal Justice 329, 338 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1985).
37. Becker, supra note 3.
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would mean that the cost-minimizing solution, x*(k), would be socially
optimal since the society would be willing to make explicit distinctions
among people based on the crucial characteristic. Or in the context of
formulating optimal policy toward crime, it might render permissible
the specification of different probability-of-punishment/severity-of-
punishment combinations for individuals with different k levels.
But the moral dimensions of the criminal categorization can work
in the other direction as well, to countervail against any tendency to
draw lines that the society deems illegitimate or morally suspect. For a
society of the type we have now hypothesized, punishment for a crime
carries with it moral condemnation and the implication that the person
to whom punishment is meted out deserves to be punished. But, given
that weighty implication, such a society may tend to impose an exceed-
ingly demanding standard of culpability for an action it labels a crime
and may be correspondingly reluctant to invoke distinctions it consid-
ers morally dubious. Similarly, since the prosecution of crimes brings
the weight of the state down upon an individual member of society, we
may find that the state is even more hesitant to classify individuals on
the basis of suspect crucial characteristics in criminal cases.
I am not drawing any specific conclusion about how far our hypo-
thetical society's grounding of criminal liability in moral culpability
would carry it in respecifying the problem of choosing a system to cope
with the harms we have been discussing. For example, some harms
might be so morally condemned by the society that the injurer's utility
would be severely discounted while others might result in very little, if
any, discounting of the injurer's benefits. Without more information
about the society in our example, we cannot be specific about the impli-
cations for the problem posed. But the central point is that information
about the basic legal and political structure of the society is needed
before a law-and-economics analysis of a society's harm control system
can go forward.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Someone who views legal rules wholly in terms of the functions
they are meant to serve would probe beyond the statement of the soci-
ety's imperative that distinctions not be drawn on the basis of the char-
acteristic indexed by k and beyond the statement of a moral foundation
for the criminal category. He would ask what "more basic" purpose
each of these serves. Perhaps such a functionalist would attempt to ar-
gue that each of these positions could be resolved into decisions
grounded in efficiency reasons and distributional preferences. I am du-
bious that this can be done, in particular with regard to the moral foun-
dation of the criminal category. But to the extent that distributional
judgments and even efficiency rationales are the source of these struc-
tural features, my basic point remains intact: legal and political presup-
positions underlie law-and-economics analysis, and the value of our
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analyses depends as crucially on correctly specifying the basic political
and legal structure of a society as it does on correctly specifying the
production functions and transaction relations to which we usually
devote more attention.
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